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CHAPTER 1.
THE CLASSICAL SYSTEM AND THEORY OF SOCIAL OWNERSHIP
1. Development of social ownership in the socialist society.
2. The economic justification of nationalisation — unnecessary nationali­
sations.
3. The insignificant role of economic automatisms.
4. Is state ownership of the means of production necessary in order that 
social production be in the interest of the people ?
5. Summary.
1. At the VHtli Party Congress in November 1918, Lenin defined the 
fundamental organisational task of \,he relation between a socialist economy 
and society, saying that the entire machinery of state economy must be 
transformed into a single gigantic machine, and this machine should work in 
such a way that hundreds of millions of people are directed by a single plan.1 
W hen Lenin was setting this aim, he envisaged a machinery that would persist 
during the entire era of socialism. Lenin’s conception stated the people’s 
economic plan as the principal facet of the relation economy and society. The 
setting of this aim is the principal thesis relating to the fundamental conception 
of the development of the entire socialist economy, to the correlation between 
society and economy. In Lenin’s notion the emphasis rests on the plan, on 
a plan which moves the entire people’s economy, all its units, into one direction, 
mobilises them for realising the economic tasks that face society. Socialism 
cannot exist without a central plan, and consequently — as is indicated by 
progress to date at least — it cannot exist without an organisation which:
a) carries out the direction of economic tasks on the national-economic 
level,
b) ensures a planned, co-ordinated course of development of the people’s 
economy as a whole,
c) sees that surplus product be used in accordance with public interest
d) ensures that those participating in productive and other activities 
important for society -  economic organisations and individual producers 
personally -  be interested in the activities they display, without individuals 
or their groups being permitted to appropriate the results of the work of others.
To put it shorter, all this means that a socialist economy — no matter 
within what framework the economic activities take place — must be organised 
also on the social level, including both production and appropriation. Yet his­
tory teaches us that to organise an economy on the social level is not a suffi­
cient way of organising economic activities, because this is completed by the 
self-movement of certain economic nodal points for organising productive 
work of their own or of others (enterprises, co-operatives, trusts, associations, 
etc.).
The economy of countries which have started on the way of building a 
socialist society was characterised by the fact — with great differences by 
countries and also by certain economic branches — that the concentration of 
production and the centralisation of capital have been realised to a considerable 
extent. “From the series of certain operations, production has become a series 
of social operations, and the products of individuals have become social pro­
duct. Yarn, cloth, metalware which are now turned out by the factories were 
the joint products of many workers, for they had to pass through many a 
worker’s hands until they were finished. Not one worker could have said: it is 
me that has made this, this is my product, because social production emerged 
in addition to individual production”, writes Engels in Anti-Diihring.2
When production becomes a social activity on various levels, the organi­
sation of both production and appropriation must be solved on these levels; 
a t the same time, all types of production — because in certain relations all 
kinds of non-natural production are also of an all-social character — must be 
organised on the all-social level, too, in the circumstances of socialism, irres­
pective of intermediate solutions that may exist on whatever level, by the 
placement of proprietary rights on various levels (ownership of the people 
collectively, of groups, of private persons for some time). What kind of organi­
sation is fit for organising production and appropriation on the social level ?
a) Such an organisation must certainly be one which exercises the right 
of disposal over a considerable portion of social accumulation.
h) which has enough authority to enforce its will which is destined to 
express the interests of society as a whole.
To build up such an organisation would certainly have been less difficult 
if the proletarian revolutions had been victorious in the circumstances envisa­
ged by Marx and Engels. Marx and Engels had placed the revolution of the 
proletariat in an environment where and when:
1. The whole world was ripe for revolution, and the latter would have 
emerged as a world revolution. In such a situation, after a prompt crushing the 
power of the resisting bourgeoisie, revolutionary élan can rapidly grow into a 
high measure of socialist consciousness, and it is usually possible without using 
force — or at least possible without using a separate organ of coercion — to 
organise society for social tasks. Such a situation excludes the existence of a 
capitalist environment, holds out the possibilities of a soundly proportionate 
development of the people’s, or perhaps the world’s economy, and there is no 
need for evading ten or hundred times the fundamental rules, following from 
the given circumstances of society, precisely in order to protect a socialist- 
communist society.
As a further prerequisite the classics have defined a situation in which 
production has become social to such an extent, the forces of production have
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been concentrated on such a level, that their organisation and social appro­
priation on the basis of production socialised on a high level can be directed 
in their entirety by a single organisation, and appropriation can become 
directly social. They believed that given a very high concentration of produc­
tion in every branch, or at least in the most important branches of the people’s 
economy, the economy as a whole could be directed and controlled as one single 
plant, one single factory. Labour would be manifest as the direct work of 
society, and to satisfy oneself of its social usefulness would be possible not 
only by comparing it to other work. They held it possible that in such cir­
cumstances an organisation — established by society — would be able with 
the widest co-operation of the employed population to exercise fu ll control in 
every direction over the economic activities of the whole of society.
Yet the proletarian revolutions did not break out all over the world at the 
same time. Of several ruling working-classes, assuming power over society for 
a while, it was only one, the Soviet proletariat, that was able to stay in power 
long enough to start the building of socialism in fact. The circumstance that 
the proletariat’s power was victorious in one country only, inevitably delayed 
the crushing of the bourgeoisie’s resistance, prevented revolutionary élan 
from going over without any break into high socialist consciousness; for pre­
serving the independence of the state, the proletariat’s power, the forces of 
economy had to be devoted to tasks for a long time, which would not have 
been present if there had been a world-wide victory of the revolution.
Also the state of production concentration differed from the circumstances 
envisaged by Marx and Engels. The victory of the revolution in Russia, and 
later on also in the democratic countries was confronted with economic sys­
tems whose concentration was far below the one existing in highly developed 
western countries taken as the norm by Marx and Engels; where even in the 
industries, or their majority at least — let alone agriculture — the conditions 
of a single-centre direction envisaged by the classics were less given.3
In a considerable part of the industries, production was going on in thou­
sands of small work-shops: the spinning wheel, the hand loom, the blacksmith’s 
hammer — these medieval, small, limited tools were just as important means 
of production as centuries before. Big estates only concentrated the ownership 
of land, but their equipment consisted of prinvtive implements for the most 
part. Production actually consisted in the mass utilisation of small-peasant 
methods of produ tion on one big estate, and machines or modern methods of 
production were hardly introduced, or not at all. For political reasons the 
revolutions split up these big estates, and small productive unites became 
general practice in agriculture as a result.1
It was just therefore that vigorous debates arose in the Soviet Union in 
the 20s about:
a) whether such central control can possibly be established, and
b) in what sphere that organisation is to be found which in the interest 
of a planned economy can carry out the organisation on the social level of 
all kinds of production, ensuring at the same time social appropriation. I t was 
voiced in these debates that such an organisation could be some kind of trade 
union centre; in other views it should have been some other comprehensive social 
organisation. In these debates the state was mentioned as possessing executive 
power, embodying the political power of society, and as an organisation fit for
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such tasks. Finally the choice fell upon the state f  not at all by chance in given 
circumstances.
Owing to its supreme power, the state was a body embracing the whole 
of society, had at its disposal the best developed machinery which could be 
made suitable for solving also economic tasks without any substantial reorga­
nisation. I t had an organisation suited for the centralisation of a portion of the 
incomes, for collecting a definite part of incomes from the producers. It 
seemed that the state was fit for directing economy as a whole, that also the 
organisation of distribution could be realised through the state; and. last but not 
least, the choice fell on the state because it has an adequate organ of coercion 
to enforce its will against anybody in the field of organising production on the 
social level, and in the field of organising appropriation.8
It was in this way that the socialist state became the organiser of social 
production and appropriation; and this was effected in such a manner that 
the state reserved itself the ownership of the means of production considered 
to be fundamental, appropriated also in the legal sense these means, being the 
supreme economic power, and was able to ensure in other fields of production 
that productive activities were carried out in accordance with comprehensive 
national-economic plans, that part of the incomes produced there became all­
social income. Hence the state became the owner as the supreme power, or, more 
exactly, became the owner because it was the supreme power.
Two questions may be raised:
a) why did the state become the owner in certain fields, the owner of 
the means of production first of all, why was it not enough to make the state 
avail itself of the various possibilities of its power to direct as a non-owner 
economic activities based on the property of non-exploiting collectives ?
b)  Why was the state not made owner of all means of production ? Why 
was it considered sufficient that the state should direct and influence certain 
spheres of production without being the owner in these spheres ? In other 
words: why did the state only endeavour to effect central direction of pro­
duction in certain fields, why did not all means of production become state 
property ?
2. The degree of the socialisation of production also determines the social 
level of appropriation. Looked at from another angle, a high-level direction of 
production is possible with the required efficiency only on an adequate level 
of socialisation. History shows that at the time of establishing the system of 
socialist ownership, there always have been, in every country, fields of pro­
duction, entire branches of the people’s economy, where the degree of the 
socialisation of production was very low, e. g. in tire bulk of agricultural 
production. The circumstance that the socialisation of production was low in 
a given branch of production at the time of the victory of socialism does not in 
itself make impossible to raise ownership to a higher level than the given level 
of production socialisation, if we make efforts to create a sufficient concentra­
tion of production, because this is necessary and possible in the given period. 
Yet such concentration, at least at a rapid pace, is extremely costly. In the 
socialist countries victorious so far, the productive forces of agriculture were 
practically not socialised at all; moreover, it was exactly the victorious prole­
tarian revolutions that made efforts — as has been mentioned — at a décon­
centration of existing concentration. (The Hungarian Soviet Republic, for
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instance, tried to maintain the existing concentration in agriculture, even to 
socialise agricultural production on a broader basis, but — as is known — her 
efforts failed.) I t  is just therefore that state ownership was realised in the in­
dustrial field first, where the concentration of production was more intense, 
or where the creation of a higher level of concentration became soon, and 
imperiously, a matter of necessity. Concentration was usually high in the field 
of heavy industry, in the field of mining, energy production and transports serv­
ing heavy industry; thus nationalisation first began here, as well as in respect 
to the postal and telegraphic services.7 In other branches, though the socia­
lisation of production was not of a high degree in the given situation (e. g. 
in the light industry, food industry, trade), there was possibility for a rapid 
concentration. The high-level organisation of appropriation, which was legally 
manifest in the form of social ownership on a high level, represented an 
attractive force in a certain sense, even if not for raising the socialisation of 
production to such a high degree as the one on which ownership manifested 
itself (this gave rise to serious difficulties in some cases later on).8 Hence the 
creation of social ownership of the highest level, i. e. state ownership, became 
possible in the industrial field because:
a) the degree of socialisation of production made possible, even necessary, 
the centralised combination of production and appropriation in certain in­
dustrial branches,
b) it was believed that in the fields where the concentration of production 
was not of such a high level, desirable progress could be attained by nationalisa­
tion taking place also here. In other branches of production the aforesaid high 
level of ownership was not realized because the lack, or extremely low degree, of 
socialisation did not make it possible, and the concentration of production in 
these branches did not seem to be a matter of great urgency.9
As concerns the circumstance that, essentially, industry as a whole, and 
even certain means of production outside the industries in some socialist 
countries, went over into state ownership, the question presented itself whether 
it was necessary to organise appropriation with legal means in such a way 
that the element of appropriation within proprietary rights should be mani­
fest in the form of a socialist ownership of the state in those fields where the 
forces of production have reached a certain level of socialisation — but not yet 
the all-social level — or efforts have been made to reach a certain level. Doubt­
less, the all-social facet is to be found in every productive activity. A portion 
of incomes is collected by the state in every case to exert influence on various 
economic units with its help — ranging from individual producers to collecti­
ves — and in order that, having hold of these incomes, it should be able to 
promote by economic influencing, manifest also as legal means of this or that 
form, their working in the direction of one target. But it is not indifferent in 
respect to determining the level of ownership in what quality and quantity 
the social character is present. I believe that at the time of the great waves 
of nationalisation the social facet actually existing for the most part in any 
productive activity was exaggerated quantitatively, and overemphasized 
qualitatively without good reason, and that no sufficient attention was paid 
at the determination of the ownership level whether the given productive acti­
vity is mature enough as a whole for organising appropriation in the form of 
state ownership. We may add that in deciding on nationalisation the start was
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usually made from the whole of a given economic branch, irrespective of 
whether production going on in that branch was mature for nationalisation 
as a whole. Only the all-social elements of production were emphasized, and 
the level of ownership was determined by giving prominence to the all-social 
element. Although between the two extremes: the levels of individual and 
all-social production, there may be intermediate degrees. There are branches, 
such as the heavy industry, or energy production at the peak, etc. which are 
mature for state ownership of the highest level right away; but in other branch­
es, and in the sphere of certain activities within branches, there are nodal 
points between individual and all-social production which must be taken into 
account at the legal regulation of ownership. Intermediate degrees emerge 
between degrees of all-social and individual interests. I t is true in the course 
of production getting socialised that not one worker can possibly say that this 
product is my product; it is equally true that, in the last analysis and in respect 
to various products, all-social labour is present in highly different ways and 
quantities. So it admits of no doubt that the all-social character is manifest 
in every product; but there are production processes in the course of which 
a collective can state certainly, and in conformity with facts, that this product 
is our product, when the individual and all-social nature is pushed in the back­
ground, the collective comes to the fore, and the regulation of appropriation 
can be realized at these points also on the level of ownership.
Otherwise these points of view were largely taken into account in the 
course of later development when the legal regulation of kolkhoz and co­
operative farm ownership was framed. The group-ownership of co-operatives 
is based precisely on the circumstance that proprietary legal regulation is 
centred on the collective, although it can hardly be questioned that the result 
of all-social work is present in the sphere of co-operative ownership (e.g. in the 
form of state subsidies); all-social appropriation follows from this, too, and it is 
equally true that individual activity plays a role in the activity of the collective. 
But the principal point of emphasis is the collective all the same, and it can 
and must be ensured that it has disposal as owner of the means of production 
which are required for producing the finished product of the collective with 
which it can appear on the market. This means that it must have the rights of 
possession, use and disposal of the means of production and the results of 
production, as well as the owner’s administrative rights that serve these in 
organisational ways.
Yet at the time when the socialist ownership of the state emerged, and 
quite a long time after, the recognition of the proprietorship of certain econo­
mic units was not given sufficient attention. Later on, when the co-operatives 
of productive character emerged en masse, the legal system recognised their 
proprietorship, but they were regarded as owners only in respect to the 
results of production, and not in respect to the basic means of production 
i.e. land. For a longer time it was held that the law of value is not valid 
in a socialist economy, that goods relations only exist in certain fields of 
the socialist economy, and only because of group ownership. And that they 
only exist as foreign elements in socialism, as a result of which the role 
of market and money was disclaimed in the circumstances of socialism; obvi­
ously, this has led to the negation of the detached interests of economic auto­
matisms, moreover to the negation of their proprietary interests in many
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cases. And even if this detached interest was recognised on the proprietary 
level in respect to kolkhozes or co-operative farms, remarks were added that 
group ownership is “not consistently socialist”, that group ownership is an 
“inferior form” of socialist ownership, the direct consequence of which were 
endeavours at limiting the scope of group ownership.
3. The direction by the state of enterprises organized as independent 
juristic persons operating means of production in state ownership, also showed 
peculiar features. In this respect a view established itself, or survived from 
older Marxism, according to which a people’s economy, or its part owned by 
the state at least, can be managed as one sinrjle enterprise. State ownership was 
interpreted in a way that the uniformity and indivisibility of the proprietor­
ship of the state is to mean that despite the apparent (but real on the legal 
level) detachedness of enterprises, the state, or central state agencies, can 
exercise any partial rights of ownership at any time, without any conditions and 
restrictions (self-restrictions). Thus the system of so-called direct control as a 
concept does not express exactly the relationship of the state to the means of 
production owned by it, or to the enterprises, or enterprise collectives. This 
concept is only able to express that it was possible to direct enterprises 
through instructions, although the situation was different in reality; namely the 
possibility to give instructions was only a consequence of the view according 
to which interests to be taken into account by the state as the owner, and 
being different from the all-social interests, simply do not exist. Hence the 
state, being confident that the protection of any kind of interest can be conden­
sed into the sphere of state interests, reserved all proprietary rights to itself, 
and, what is more, it did so directly in relation to the means of production 
(withdrawal, regrouping of the enterprises’ means of production). And if an 
enterprise was given instructions, this was not limited by any rights that issued 
from specific enterprisal interest.
4. In our deliberations made so far we always started from the conven­
tional and commonly accepted system of views according to which production 
going on with productive forces that have assumed a social character on a given 
level is only possible on the basis of state ownership. We now raise the question 
whether the state must necessarily become the owner of the fundamental 
means of production in order that it be able to direct social production on the 
basis of a central plan. I t is therefore necessary to investigate as an ultimate 
problem whether state ownership is absolutely necessary for organising pro­
duction on the society level.
In the developmental phases of human societies going towards socialism, 
historical experience has proved that the means of production, and the results 
of production, can be utilised to the advantage of those who are the owners of 
the means of production. This gave prominence to the notion that the results 
of production can only be put to use in the owner’s interest. Consequently, if 
we are to utilise the results of production in the interest of society as a whole, 
then — according to this view — everybody in whose interest we wish to 
ensure the direction of production and the appropriation of the results of 
production, must be made owner of the means of production. If the state wishes 
to direct production in the interest of the whole of the people — so the classical 
theory says — the state must be made the legal owner of part of the means 
of production at least, and of the fundamental means of production, tha t is;
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and through the medium of the state, all those must be made owners, too, in 
whose interest the state’s economic directive activity is being realised, and 
who share appropriation through this intermedium. And since any ruling class 
of the past was usually able to rule over the other strata of society because it 
was the owner of the means of production, and appropriated the results of 
production, it was believed that in the circumstances of socialism the working 
class must become the economically most powerful proprietory class, because 
it is economic power that supports the political power of the working class. 
Some hold that it is this proprietorship that forms the economic basis of the 
socialist state’s political power.
These experiences were inferred in a mechanistic manner from mankind’s 
history preceding socialism. Property, or ownership, which had played a do­
minant role, and determined in whose interest the results of production were 
to be utilised, or which class was to exercise political power, was assigned the 
same role as before. Yet it is equally conceivable that the socialist state need 
not necessarily acquire the ownership of the means of production in order to 
be able to control the national economy; a system of collection of accumulation 
must be framed on the basis of which the state, relying economically on the 
collected financial means, can direct the people’s economy in which the owners 
of certain parts of the means of production are also legally, and in general, 
collectives that realise the conditions free from exploitation within their own 
spheres. And that state appropriation does not depend on proprietorship has 
been proved by history because the socialist state has accumulated incomes 
also from those sectors in whose respect state proprietorship did not exist, and 
did so even in circumstances when its economic power was insignificant.
As concerns the question of political power, the latter is exercised by the 
working class not on the basis of their economic power, but on the basis of 
their political potential. Doubtless, also economic power is needed for exercis­
ing political power, but this economic power is ensured by any and all forms of 
social ownership free from exploitation (i.e. not only by socialist state owner­
ship)^
From all this we may conclude that the concept according to which state 
control of the economy must by all means be based on state ownership of the 
fundamental instruments of production, arose from a certain superstitious 
exaggeration of the importance of ownership, of proprietary and social conditions 
discredited by history, and of the proprietary rights expressing these conditions.
The classical scheme of the socialist ownership system, still generally 
asserting itself in a number of socialist countries, can be characterised as a 
summary of what we have said as follows:
5. a) The owner of the fundamental means of production is the state. The 
state endeavours to become the owner of the bulk of these means. The prin­
cipal objects of state socialist ownership are the means of production. State 
property is realised first of all in the sphere of industrial activities interpreted 
in a broader sense, usually irrespective of how high the degree of the socialisa­
tion of productive forces is in given branches, and irrespective of whether the 
socialisation level of all activities within a branch reaches the level required 
for state ownership or not.
h) Within this classical system of ownership, the state imposes no rest­
riction whatever on itself in the sphere of proprietary rights; it does not
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recognise enterprise interests as individual ones, standing between personal 
and all-social interests; and it reserves itself the right as the owner of the 
means of production to do anything it pleases with the means of production 
which are dominated by it on the basis of proprietary rights.
c) For the groups of means of production which are not exclusive pro­
perty of the state -  these are, in the last analysis, the second set of these 
means, and an insignificant portion of the agricultural co-operatives — soci­
alist group ownership is realised in the form of co-operative ownership; but 
this is considered not to be consistently socialistic, to be an inferior form, and 
the consequence is that in practice this type of group ownership is subjected 
to considerable restrictions.
CHAPTER II.
THE JUGOSLAV CONCEPT OF SOCIAL OWNERSHIP
6. The essence of the Jugoslav ownership theory.
7. The relationships between the state, local state organs, and economic 
units.
8. Summary.
6. The Jugoslav conception differs substantially from this traditional 
scheme of the socialist ownership system.10 The Jugoslav theoreticians admit 
the necessity and existence of social ownership within Jugoslavia’s economy. 
Yet this admission does not amount to recognition in the legal sense. According 
to the view of the Jugoslav scholars, social ownership, as a proprietary right, 
does not at all manifest itself as a uniform subjective right. No distinction is 
made between state and co-operative property, because — as they say — social 
property has no such single owner as the state or a co-operative; quite the 
contrary, since social property forms property of the society as a whole, no 
single owner exists in the legal sense within the sphere of social property. This 
view is actually a negation of the manifestation of property in the sense of 
the right of ownership. Considering, however, that social property must be afford­
ed protection (somebody is compelled to request protection; the title is in 
need of protection against somebody in the interest of somebody, social pro­
perty assumes the character of merchandise, lienee the subjects of commodity 
exchange must be defined; responsibility is attached to production and econo­
mic activity; the objects of social ownership are used and utilised by separate 
work organisations), various approaches are being made in literature to find 
the different subjects partially entitled to this non-uniform subjective right of 
ownership. According to some views, social ownership has not one, but several 
entitled subjects. In the last analysis, anybody who shares appropriation oi 
incomes, or takes part in their production, or is active with means that form 
social property and are in his management, is qualified to be some kind of 
entitled subject. As a consequence, the subjects entitled to social property 
include social enterprises, state and social organs, non-economic socialist 
organisations. This kind of property is called in the literature fragmented 
property. According to fragmentation, the contents of ownership are illustrat­
ed by several types of title. Rights of property, rights under public law, rights
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defined by political law, are mentioned in the sphere of ownership; rights of 
property are regarded as the private-law component of social ownership, 
lights undei public law and constitutional rights as the public-law component 
of social ownership.
As concerns the planned direction of production, the necessity of a state 
plan is disclaimed in the Jugoslav view; socialist state planning is looked at 
with criticism, by making reference especially to its bureaucratic nature 
(there is some truth in this), but the necessity of planning in general is not 
negated.
7. Many believe in Hungary, and also in other socialist countries, that 
since in Jugoslavia there is no such central, co-ordinating, planning organ 
(e.g. a state organisation that controls the most general national-economic 
processes, or prepares plans broken down to enterprises) as we have it, or as 
exists in other socialist countries, all-social planning is altogether nonexistent, 
or that all-social planning only consists in the collection of the plans of thé 
\ aiious collectives. \ et this is ?iot so. Doubtless, the plan of the producing 
collectives seems to be of primary importance. But however much our Jugoslav 
friends are against state planning, the state-political organisations play an 
important role in the preparation of the so-called social plans of Jugoslavia 
and the îepublics, I even venture to say that the voice of local organs in the 
life of various enterprises is heard more powerfully than was the case in Hun­
gary some time ago (and by no means in such a bureaucratic form as was 
usual here). But the plan on whose basis the entire people’s economy develops 
is, according to the Jugoslav doctrine, not a state plan in the last analysis, but 
a social plan.
Summing up the substance of the Jugoslav conception, we may point out 
the following features:
8. a) A novel conception of social ownership has developed in Jugoslavia. 
They do not recognise differences between state and other social ownership 
forms. Social ownership is manifest in one single form. Social ownership has no 
single subject, and the situation is interpreted either as everybody being the 
owner, without proprietary rights, of the socially owned means of production, 
piov ided that lie shares the appropriation of incomes produced by such means; 
or it is maintained that social owership legally only exists in partial titles' 
whereby the subjects are carriers of these partial titles.
h) Planning is considered necessary. But planning — even as concerns 
the most comprehensive plans -  is not a function of the state, but the plan is 
called a social plan. \  arious working organisations, socio-political communities 
take part in shaping the social plan, and a considerable measure of state influ­
ence asserts itself, too. The various working organisations display their acti­
vities with seemingly complete independence; yet in practice we experience a 
vigorous influence of political communities of various levels on the activities 
of the economic units.
c) In my humble opinion, neither the classical socialist, nor the original 
Jugoslav socialist version of the ownership system have reached the optimal 
solution, fo r the classical socialist conception of ownership exaggerates, or at 
least is liable to exaggerate, the all-social aspects of production; and the Ju ­
goslav construction in reality attaches the decisive role to automatisms — 
even in contradiction to certain theoretical theses -  whereby the all-social
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character of social production is getting lost, or at least the system involves 
the risk that the all-social nature may get lost in given cases.
I t may be concluded from what we have exposed so far that at present 
there are two socialist conceptions of social ownership, at least so far as can be 
concluded from available literature and from information gathered through 
other contacts.
The first change in respect to social ownership is manifest exactly in this 
duality, which appears, against one-time uniformness, both in practice and 
theory.
CHAPTER III.
CHANGES IN THE CLASSICAL MODEL
9. Novel features in the relationship between the state and state-owned 
enterprises.
10. The sphere of objects of co-operative socialist ownership is ceaselessly 
expanding.
11. Co-operative ownership is suitable for a high-level concentration of 
production, for a high-degree socialisation of productive forces, for expressing 
concentration and the high degree of socialisation.
9. In the following we shall investigate what changes have taken place 
in the sphere of social ownership developed on the basis of the first conception. 
To date, we are confronted with changes which do not affect the fundamental 
conception. It is another matter that from the changes so far we m; v' perhaps 
identify an alteration of certain partial principles, while the fundamental 
conception is maintained. It is yet another matter that these changes, al­
though not yet manifest in a legal form, provide the possibility to draw the 
outlines of a new conception of social ownership for the future.
These changes have been brought about, first of all, by novel economic 
realizations. Of these I should like to mention but the most important ones. 
I t has been realized that the existence of merchandise relations is a natural 
concomitant of the socialist economy. Accordingly, a wider field must be ensu­
red to monetary and market relations for asserting themselves. In order that 
market impulses make felt their effect on production, we must find those orga­
nisational units which are fit for appearing on the market independently, and 
are also fit for being affected by market impulses. I t has been realized that 
there exist such units on the various levels of social production, i.e. the enter­
prises with interests of their own; and in order to make them appear on the 
market, the collectives incorporated in them had to be made interested in 
such activities. In respect to the relationship between the state and economic 
automatisms, this has led to the conclusion that the people’s economy cannot, 
and as a matter of fact, need not be directed like a single industrial unit.
It has been learned that these automatisms, as the selfregulators of partial 
processes, save the centre the trouble of following every vibration of economic 
life; that they make it possible for the centre to concentrate forces on problems 
of really national-economic scope, to develop and select the best variants, and 
to work out the operating principles of central and automatic regulators. 
Automatic regulators provide the possibility to transfer central decisions to the
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aggregate process in such a way that this does not involve a ceaseless inter­
ference with enterprise management, and with the inherent rules of the many- 
sided economic relations; it therefore does not inhibit the positive initiatives 
of individuals, collectives, local leaders; it rather offers a larger scope for unfol­
ding their spontaneous activities, independent economic thinking, creative 
powers, and their responsibility for rationalisation.
It is exactly through these automatisms that separate socialist group interests 
get access to the form of free movement that fits them, in which they can express 
themselves adequately, in which they can get together, can coordinate them­
selves through mutual check-ups; and these automatisms will provide them 
with the scope in which their relatively independent actions can realize. The 
recognition of this role of economic automatisms has moved state economic 
leadership to devote great attention to them, irrespective of the economic 
field they appear in, i. e. irrespective of whether enterprises operating within 
the sphere of state socialist ownership, or co-operatives, are involved.In order to 
promote their self-expression, their getting confronted with one another, inter­
ference with the self-movement of automatisms has been restricted; it was 
attempted to make them fit for appearing on the market independently, and to 
make also their collectives interested, in such appearance. Yet in order that the 
control and direction of economic activities should be preserved on the all-social 
level, direct orders (of which not the form, but their entering into the self-mo­
vement of automatisms is what matters) were replaced by automatisms, and 
the economic units were placed in an environment whose principal characteris­
tic is that the state, not being identical with the enterprises, influences them 
with economic means of its own.
The changes in the relationship of state and enterprise, manifest also on 
the level of legal regulation, may be summed up as the state having given up to 
interfere with the spontaneous activities of economic units. This means that 
although the state reserves proprietary rights to the enterprises’ state-owned 
assets, it has waived the right to exercise proprietorship at any time, in any way, 
in connection with the enterprises means of production and the results of produc­
tion. Provisions of law give definite outlines of the spheres of authority, of the 
tasks of supervisory and branch organs, of the legal forms of procedures, and 
ensure thereby the uncurtailed exercise of rights due to enter-prises.
10. Substantial changes have taken place in the sphere of production co­
operative ownership, primarily in the ownership of agricultural production co­
operatives. The changes here have started even more far back than in the 
industries. Already the agrarian-political theses of the Hungarian Socialist 
Workers’ Party have stated that to direct co-operatives by administrative 
measures is not permissible. But in practice it was not possible to enforce this 
fundamental principle consistently. This can be realized only with the change­
over to the new economic system, and it would seem to me that this is possible 
only gradually. Another important step early in the 60s was that the com­
pulsory regulations relating to the internal life of co-operatives ceased to have effect 
for the most part, whereby the principle of co-operative self-administration has 
been given full play.
Yet the most important are the changes which took place
a) in the sphere of co-operative ownership,
b) in the organisation of co-operative management, and
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c) in the sphere of joining the economic forces of production co-operati­
ves, or their forces with those of other socialist organisations.
’ A c c o rd in g  to  th e  t r a d i t io n a l  v ie w  a b o u t  c o - o p e ra t iv e  s o c ia l is t  o w n e r s h ip  in  
H u n g a r ia n  s o c ia l is t  ju r is p r u d e n c e ,  a n d  a c c o r d in g  to  t h e  c o r re s p o n d in g  leg a l 
r e g u la t io n 12:
1 Co-operative ownersliip may comprise assets whose possession by the 
co-operative is necessary for planned co-operative management, and for increa­
sing the welfare of the co-operative’s members (Civil Code, Section 180 (1)).
* This definition of the objects of co-operative ownership -  meaningless 
due to this overgencralised formulation -  can serve as a guidance only if we 
take into account the following:
a) In the Hungarian People’s Republic we find several types of co-opera­
tive. There are co-operatives of the producing and the non-producing type. 
Those of the producing type are either agricultural or industrial co-operatives. 
In the agricultural and the industrial group alike, there are several other co­
operative formations, in addition to agricultural and to the artisans’ co-operati­
ves. The most important among the non-producing types are perhaps the 
consumers’ and sales co-operatives, and others (housing, savings, etc.) are 
active too. So many co-operatives, so many co-operative activities, even more 
sorts of activity may be within a single one. Accordingly, management re­
quires one type of assets here, another there, again another in the third. A 
certain uniformisation was manifest in the regulations which tried strictly to 
define the line of a given type, stating the sphere of activity the co-operatives 
belonging to a given group are supposed to display. Yet not even the sphere 
of activity defined by provisions of law remained unchanged. Hence the cate­
gory of objects of co-operative ownership cannot be defined with general vali­
dity: the category of objects in co-operative ownership changes with the indivi­
dual co-operative, or, more exactly, with the particular type of co-operative 
activity.
b) On the other hand, not all assets required for planned management, and 
for increasing the welfare of members, are owned by the co-operatives. Part ol 
the means of production required for working, and the means of decisive impoi t- 
ance at that, belong to owners other than the co-operative — this was especially 
the case before changing over to the new economic system ( -  machines owned 
by the state, land by private persons, etc.). And even the promotion of the 
members’ welfare was not possible solely by relying on co-operative assets. 
Owing to the past pricing policy, which was badly disadvantageous to co-opera­
tive farms, co-operatives had no choice but to implore for state “grants” in 
order that the membership could be kept at the subsistence level, not to speak 
of the time when compulsory produce delivery forced co-operatives to balance 
at the verge of economic ruin, and disorganised agricultural production. This 
actual situation was expressed by the juristic view, according to which:
2. The sphere of the objects of co-operative socialist ownership is limited. 
This limitation is twofold:
a) Objects of exclusive state ownership may not be owned by co-operatives. 
This view, formulated also as a provision of law, naturally related only to 
objects which were exclusively and unconditionally in state ownership (Civil 
Code, Section 168 (1)).
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b) While the typical and principal objects of stale socialist ownership are the 
means of production, the typical and principal objects of co-operative ownership
mainly in the domain of production co-operatives — are the results of the 
productive work of those who joined hands in the co-operative.13
t considerable changes have taken place in this interpretation of co-operative 
ownership since that time, and these changes took place not onlv in theorv 
but m reality as well.
flie first step was to recognise, in addition to the typical and principal 
objects of co-operative ownership, such ownership of the means of production 
as were considered to be oi decisive importance for the co-operative’ s principal 
line oi activity. r
1 he fiist significant change took place when the purchase of machinery was 
made possible. In the beginning this meant usually the purchase of agricultural 
machines (those needed for prime production in the strict sense); this was 
followed by handing over or selling to production co-operatives implements 
and equipment by which certain co-operatives or their ad hoc or permanent 
partnerships became altogether self-sufficient in every respect connected with 
the use oi machine pools (e. g. handing over equipment for machine repair units 
or to complete such units).
Next came the recognition of the land ownership of agricultural production 
co-operatives. Thus land -  which according to the classical view is either 
exlusive property of the sate from the outset in a socialist system, or if not 
will become state property some time later by any means, but may not be the 
object of co-operative socialist ownership (as long, of course, as such economic 
organisations exist at all) — went over into the ownership of production co­
operatives.
The category of the ownership of means of production was further extended 
when the sphere of co-operative activities was expanded by law; those means of 
production went into co-operative ownership as a result, which were not intended 
typically for conventional agricultural production.
Since the economic purpose and possibilities of production co-operatives 
were given an extended interpretation in the new Co-operatives Act, production 
co-operative ownership now can include any assets that are necessary for 
collective, large-scale agricultural jiroduction, auxiliary and processing in­
dustrial activities, sales activities of the producing co-operative, and for all 
and any activities permissible under provisions of law on the basis of, or with­
out, a licence. On this basis, the thesis can be stated that production co-opera­
tives have the right to procure means of production which are not intended for 
agriculture in the strict sense, and to use them for purposes of their own; so they 
have the right to own any means of production which do not belong to that 
sphere of production where it is not necessary to keep the concentration of 
such means on the all-social level. As a consequence of the process during which 
production co-operatives enter into partnership witli one another, and with 
state enterprises on different levels, any equipment that can be operated in the
held of food economy may finally be drawn into the sphere of co-operative 
ownership.
from that time on when co-operatives were allowed to enter into partner­
ship with one another and with state enterprises for the purpose of economic 
co-operation, it has become general practice that not only the result of joint
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activities, but also the fixed assets made available by the partners for partner­
ship purposes, went into the ownership of the parties or the partnership. Pur­
suant to valid legal regulation, this is specifically the case with the joint under­
takings of agricultural production co-operatives, and with co-operative joint 
enterprises.
Some general conclusions may be drawn freim all this.
a) Among the object, of co-operative ownership — what we refer to here 
is producing co-operatives first of all -  the first place in the category of funda­
mental and typical objects is occupied by the means of production. The socialist 
proprietorship of production co-operatives is that kind of ownership which 
relates first of all to the basic means of production required for the co-operati­
ve’s activities, and, depending on this, to the results of production and other 
goods in the second place.
b) from  this conclusion it also follows that a production co-operative is a 
co-operative enterprise which pursues its fundamental activities with means of 
production that are owned by it; vice versa, it seems proper that all means of 
production by which such activities are performed should go into the ownership of 
the co-operative, or co-operative organ concerned, or those participating in it.
W e think it natural that in our given circumstances the situation is not 
mature enough, and will perhaps never be, for all means of production used by a 
co-operative in its sphere of activities going into the co-operative’s ownership. 
Owing to this situation, the means of production used, for instance, in land 
improvement, water conservancy, as well as other fundamental means of 
production do not belong to the sphere of co-operative socialist ownership. 
 ^ch despite all this, we may state that it is the principal rule for means of 
production used in co-operative activities, for the object of work, and for 
capital equipment alike that some kind of co-operative ownership should 
materialise for all these, and that other proprietary rights relating to them 
should be the exception.
c) Hence the proport ion of the means of production for which co-operative 
ownership materialises in some way or other keeps extending, i. e. the category 
of objects of co-operative ownership keeps broadening. And the ownership of 
means of production in their possession on the one hand widens the sphere of 
other objects that can be in co-operative ownership, on the other hand it gene­
rally consolidates the proprietorship of the co-opetatives.
d) Nor can we disregard the fact that while in the past the assets manifest 
as means of production in the co-operatives belonged to the production co­
operatives only legally for the most part because their equivalent had not been 
paid for, today the situation in practice is that the co-operatives can actually 
regard all these as their own. Although the various forms of subsidies must be 
maintained, their distribution and uses have been modified substantially in the 
circumstances of the new economic system. In this new system the living 
standards permit the increase of co-operative net incomes, and this, too, con­
tributes to the consolidation of independence; for there is no co-operative 
accumulation without co-operative net incomes, and co-operative independence 
cannot assert itself sufficiently without accumulation. Although it is not closely 
correlated with our subject, we mention that the personal incomes of co-opera­
tive members are increasing, and this puts an end to that often intolerably 
disadvantageous situation which pushed many of the workers of production
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co-operatives deep below the living standards of other producing sectors. Cate­
gories emerge in co-operative activities which in the past existed only in the 
management of state enterprises, and, vice versa, state enterprises make use of 
categories which in the past were regarded as typically co-operative forma­
tions. Of these categories we may mention attempts at introducing enterprisal 
management, the increase of one-man responsibility in management, the pay­
ment of wages, profitability, etc.
But let us revert to the thesis that the sphere of objects in co-operative 
ownership is broadening as a rule.
From the fact that in certain concrete fields of the manifold productive 
human activities the development degree of the productive forces makes 
necessary and possible various levels of production socialisation, it follows that 
appropriation, notably appropriation of a co-operative character of the means 
of production, can take place on different levels even within one given sector.
Co-operative appropriation of the means of production, and the increase of 
the scope of objects of ownership, can take place
a) within a single co-operative
b) within the scope of entering into partnership with other co-operatives,
c) within the scope of partnership with state enterprises,
d) through creating some type of central co-operative funds.
ad a) The trend that the co-operatives should become, as the existing 
conditions permit and to the greatest extent possible, the owners of the means 
of production and of the results of production, is highly significant in my opi­
nion. The closest unity of the worker-and-owner status is realised within the 
sphere of social property in the relationship between the co-operative and its 
members.
The members of co-operatives are owners ipso facto; and as workers they 
take part in those activities which determine directly and fundamentally their 
financial standing. True, the co-operative member as a citizen takes his share 
from the appropriation of the all-social property (if there exists proprietary 
appropriation in this spheres at all), yet the truth is that — if co-operatives are 
concerned — the basic determinant of the co-operative member’s living condi­
tions is his own co-operative.
In some co-operatives, the members’ responsibility for co-operative acti­
vities has been established, in others it has not been. The member’s “share” in 
profits and losses exists even if the responsibility for co-operative activities 
has not been formulated legally, which — in my opinion -  is not likely to 
become necessary. Interestedness of some kind in profits and losses is the funda­
mental element in any form of co-operative ownership.
As a consequence of co-operative democracy, the co-operative member 
takes part in this capacity in the management of the co-operative, taken in the 
broadest sense. In other forms of social ownership this relation — legally at 
least is — never a direct one and, moreover, in the sphere of state ownership 
this possibility is absent from the legal construction of the relationship between 
enterprise and its employee (I should like to mention here that starting from 
the legal regulation I cannot agree with the opposite views set forth by some 
scholars of labour law in this matter), and can be manifest at best in some other 
way, through civic rights and with quite a number of intermediate links.
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fl f Î hG/ if t  th.af the T°rk®r enJ°ys the status of owner in the co-operative, 
that he takes risks and is drawn into management, is in my experience of 
great consequence as concerns the increase and protection of social property 
The socialist transformation of agriculture in Hungary required great efforts- 
and we may state as well that in the beginning the resolution of the peasantry 
to live in these new circumstances was not at all a common feature. On the 
other hand, the situation today is that the relationship of the members to the 
objects of common property is usually better than that of the average employees 
of state enterprises. Although the direct awareness and feeling of proprietorship 
is not the only means of stimulating people to accomplish the aforementioned
° ne ,°f the most imP°rtan t means; it is therefore
, isable that the means of production used for activities which can be sociali­
sed on the co-operative level should be in co-operative ownership.
The expansion of the category of co-operative ownership should be insisted 
on for yet another reason. If the rule that the level of appropriation must be on 
the level of production socialisation is correctly interpreted, namely that if a 
fundamental part of certain activities can be carried out within the scope of n 
socialist collective free from exploitation, and if the co-operation of other organi­
sations m these activities is required only within the sphere of commodity rela­
tions that can be transacted only by means of contracts,-!, e. the activity in ques­
tion does not require socialisation on a very high level -  ownership can be 
placed on this level, too. Apart from the reasons stated above, also experience 
shows that co-operatives are more lively in economic life, than are the state- 
owned enterprises. If tasks required the same internal conditions are made 
tasks of co-operatives and state enterprises to which the same einditions are 
available, well-organised co-operatives usually start to realise them sooner, and 
realise them more successfully, if the external conditions for this are mven
(decisions are easier to reach, less instances of approval are needed, there is 
less bureaucracy).
In practice the expansion of the sphere of co-operative property has been 
lealised especially in agricultural production co-operatives. Such expansion was 
made possible by the following:
aa) the experience and assumption that co-operative activity can com­
prise, in addition to agricultural production, a certain phase of produce proces­
sing, as well as servicing and other complementary activities,
ab) the experience that owing to the specialisation of production the 
complex inclusion of a given food-economic activitv within one unit can im­
prove efficiency,
ar) the realisation that decentralised agricultural production co-operatives 
are not able to fight out equality of rights if faced with monopolv organisations, 
that this fight cannot be waged merely by legal means, interest protection, but 
tliat this requires economic power.
As a consequence of all this, the co-operatives must increase the stock and 
assortment of then- means of production.
The circumstance that the secondary activities of agricultural production 
co-operatives have been introduced in practice also contributed to the increase 
of means of production owned by co-operatives. These secondary activities have 
residted m the acceleration of satisfying the needs of the people’s economy, 
in full employment for the membership, in an increased rentability of opera- 
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tions and in the acceleration of accumulation. To these generally known 
results I should like to add that a prompter adjustment of production to needs 
was also made easier by the expansion of the sphere of activity, and that the 
leo-al capacity of the co-operatives increased.
° An increase in co-operative property is desirable, as a matter oi course, in 
any co-operative in the sense that it should promote their principal line of acti- 
Vit,/. But it happens nevertheless that the secondary activities in agricultural 
co-operatives depart from this desirable course to a smaller or greater extent. 
In m y  view, the reasons of this departure have not been analysed thoroughly to 
date. We must keep in mind for the iuture that
aa) more and more manpower is released in the field of agricultural pro­
duction This labour force which was bound to place in the past even by provi­
sions of law, has become deeply rooted in rural communities; their permanent 
employment on the spot encounters difficulties, and their emloyment in industry 
presents a problem for other reasons; this means that the consequences ot 
former restrictions, which are now felt as a disadvantage, have not yet been 
liquidated. This permanent or periodic excess of labour is felt by co-operatives 
much more intensely than by detached superior management which has to rely on 
statistics as a matter of necessity.
ab) The secondary activities of production co-operatives satisfy existing 
and sound social needs. Even at a time when these side-line activities emerged 
on a wide scope, it was exceptional to hear that products turned out by consi­
derately established subsidiary enterprises should not have been sold.
ac) The circumstance that co-operative activities compete with economic 
units which operate on the basis of state ownership is not in itself condemnable.
ad) Experience has shown that processing and independent marketing 
activities closely connected with agricultural production require much gieatei 
investment than some other activities. It we wish to stimulate the production 
co-operatives to take this course, we must give them more substantial help 
and encouragement, especially for making a start.
ae) Experience has shown that the majority of secondary activities ensures 
prompt and safe sales, early returns as a result, and accumulation of greater 
volume for the co-operatives.
af) We also must point out tha t in certain agricultural co-operatives the 
signs of a relative overproduction (vegetables, fruit, grapes) are already mani­
fest and this does not act as a stimulus to develop agricultural production.
’ ag) Finally we must mention that the monopoly organisations which 
so far usually maintained only commodity relations with agricultural production 
co-operatives, are but little inclined to establish with them firm, permanent, 
well-organised partnerships based on common risk and common interests, and 
all this might again divert the planning of activities in another direction.
All these problems require careful investigation -  which will take quite a 
time -  and the taking of many a measure in most cases. Only alter, but by 
no means before this is done, will it be possible to reach satisfactory and final 
decisions in the question on what scale, and in what spheres oi side-line activities 
is it desirable to permit production co-operatives to increase their stock ot
means of production. . .
ad b) The category of means of production m co-operative ownership is
extending also by making use of appropriation methods realized through various
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forms of the economic co-operation of the co-operatives. The trends of thisco-opera- 
tion are: the modernisation of animal breeding, introduction of new technolo­
gical processes, creation of conditions for industrialised production, processing 
of agricultural produce, safer marketing of milk, meat, grapes, fruit, food, etc., 
their preservation, machine repair servicing activities in the building trade, and 
independent marketing for putting an end to the wide and unnecessary separation 
of producer and consumer as has been usual so far.
ad c) Our provisions of law make possible partnership for economic colla­
boration between co-operatives and other (non-co-operative) socialist organisa­
tions, including state enterprises. As a result of collaboration with state enter­
prises, the category of means of production going into co-operative ownership is 
extending, even in a situation of common proprietorship that differs from the 
former. These partnerships come into being for the very reason because the 
activity pursued with the means of production, which are put into operation by 
such economic collaboration, is socialised to a wider extent than would be 
possible within a co-operative.
ad d) Co-operative federations, centres create central funds from the 
contributions of member co-operatives and from other sources. Despite, or 
perhaps just because the fact that, compulsory contributions have been abo­
lished, it is to be expected that considerable amounts will be accumulated in 
these funds in the future. It would seem that the administration and spending 
of sums piled up in centres and co-operative federations, to be used for co­
operative purposes require regulation anew. I t would be desirable generally to 
spend most of these amounts on investement, and only exceptionally on poorly 
managed co-operatives.
It would deserve consideration to establish a co-operative bank for carrying 
out, first of all, credit and loan operations with these funds. Namely in this 
case the co-operative appropriation of potential means of production, of finances 
derived from co-operatives, would be realized. Needless to say, the activities 
of such a bank would have to be surrounded with well-devised rules of state 
control, and it would logically not be supposed to engage in operations reserved 
in a restricted field exclusively to the Hungarian National Bank.
II. One might ask after all this whether economic activity free from 
exploitation, taking place on the level where the socialisation of production is of 
a high degree, can be realised only in the form of state ownership, through all­
social appropriation, or in some other way too. At the beginnings ofbuilding 
socialism, the proprietary form that suited the high socialisation of production 
appeared in the socialist ownership of the state. When the start on the way 
to socialism is made, enterprises working with highly concentrated forces of 
production arc nationalised. So are other enterprises of which such a high 
degree of concentration is not characteristic, but concentration is to be a t­
tained by state ownership.
Does this mean that a situation in which the high concentration of pro­
duction develops outside state ownership, e.g. within the framework of co­
operative, or mixed social (common state and co-operative) ownership, cannot 
emerge later on ( In my view co-operative ownership and mixed social owner­
ship are suitable forms of proprietorship for developing a high degree of so­
cialisation of productive forces, and also for the proprietary expression of 
this high degree of socialisation.
C H A N G E S  IN  S O C IA L  O W N E R S H IP  21
The possibility is given for the development of a proprietary environment 
-  corresponding to the high degree of production socialisation, or promoting 
it — in co-operatives, in various partnerships of co-operatives, in partnerships 
of co-operatives with state organisations, i.c. not only in the sphere of state 
ownership. Another way of realizing social appropriation on a high level can take 
shape besides stale ownership-, especially in circumstances of proprietorship that 
emerge in the sphere of activities pursued, and ceaselessly developed, with means 
of production whose ownership is acquired by co-operative partnerships, and 
jointly by co-operatives and other socialist organisations.
As concerns the framing of provisions of law, it can therefore be recom­
mended to consider — in a not too short, but not too long time either — 
a more restricted definition or the category of objects to be left in the exclusive 
socialist ownership of the state. Rivers, channels, natural lakes, their beds, 
abandoned stream-beds and islands newly formed in rivers, public roads and 
squares definitely, natural resources according to needs, should be left in state 
ownership. Having pointed out these particular objects, the provisions of the two 
basic forms of state ownership relating to the objects of proprietorship might be 
formulated as follows:
Basic means of production, and goods important for the people's economy — 
unless an exception is made by provision of law (preferably by an act of parlia­
ment ) — may be property of the state and other socialist organisations, co-operatives 
in the first line.
CHAPTER IV.
NEW FORMS IN THE SPHERE OF SOCIAL OWNERSHIP
12. Development of mixed (inter-sector) social ownership. Difficulties, 
tasks.
13. New forms of social group ownership.
12. Novel economic formations created by partnership agreements bet­
ween enterprises represent a new feature in the structure of social ownership. 
The legal fate of assets does not presents any difficulty in the case of trusts 
and associations. Trusts and associations actually, and essentially, perform 
enterprisal tasks in fields where, owing to the relative low degree of production 
concentration, an organisation — corresponding substantially to the concent­
ration degree of production and expressing it properly — is placed between 
independent enterprises and the owner state. The situation is different in the 
case of partnerships between enterprises, especially if also non-state organi­
sations join them. If partnership is created not only between state enterprises, 
but also other socialist organisations which are active on the basis of an ow­
nership form that differs from that of the enterprises join it — the objects 
owned by the partnership cannot be referred to as purely state, or as purely 
co-operative property either. Here the owners are the state — through the 
state enterprises joining the partnership — and the other partner socialist 
organisations, in proportion to their intangible shares. We are confronted here 
with a form of common property not yet experienced in the sphere of social 
ownership. Mixed social ownership emerges in these novel economic formations.
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Endre Nizsalovszky raises the question which of the ownership forms to be 
found in a socialist society will be due to those trading companies which exercise 
actual and complete proprietary rights over their original capital, or over the 
assets that form the cover of their capital, and over other assets whose owners­
hip they acquire in the course of their operation, fie is of the opinion that 
this type of ownership should be identified as a subspecies of group ownership 
akin to co-operative ownership; but he adds quasi doubtingly whether this 
solution is correct when enterprises of the state are present solely, or for the 
most part, among the members of such a trading company.
The set of problems behind this question is most significant. According 
to present regulation, we can distinguish two basic types of partnership 
created by socialist economic units: the partnership of state enterprises, and 
the partnership of co-operatives.
Pursuant to provisions of law relating to state enterprises, these can create 
partnerships in the form of trading companies, can establish secondary enter­
prises. Secondary enterprises established by state enterprises can be of two 
types, depending on where those participating in the foundation have been 
enlisted from. Accordingly, it is possible that only state enterprises form 
the partnership (purely state-enterprise partnership), but co-operatives and 
other socialist organisations can also be founders, in addition to the state enter­
prises (partnership of mixed enterprises). Provisions of law offer the possibility 
for others — be they state enterprises, or other socialist organisations — to 
join already established partnerships (principle of open membership).
Even if there is only one state enterprise among the foundation members 
of partnerships or secondary enterprises, these are governed by the provisions 
of law relating to trading companies (joint stock companies, limited liability 
companies)15 and by rules relating to the management of state enterprises 
(investment, accounting, distribution of profits, taxation, etc.).
In the partnerships and joint enterprises of the co-operatives, the foun­
dation members are the co-operatives. Similarly to partnerships and enterprises 
founded by state enterprises, joint enterprises are of two types. If  only co­
operatives take part in partnerships or joint enterprises, we speak of “pure 
co-operative partnership of “pure co-operative joint enterprise”. If, however, 
also other socialist organisation take part in a partnership or a joint enterprise, 
this is a case of “mixed co-operative partnership” and “mixed co-operative 
joint enterprise.”
Tt should be noted that in the foundation of partnerships and joint enter­
prises of co-operative character, only co-operatives and such socialist orga­
nisations can take part which are not qualified as state economic organisations 
(enterprises, trusts, associations, economic bureaus); if there is a state enter­
prise among the founders, the partnership or joint enterprise cannot be quali­
fied as a co-operative partnership or co-operative joint enterprise. From all 
this it is obvious, too, that economic organisations of the state can become 
members of co-operative partnerships or joint enterprises only through joining.
Co-operative partnerships and co-operative joint enterprises have been 
shaped as sui generis legal forms; their establishment, activities, etc. come 
under the ruling of the Agricultural Production Co-operatives Act; in more 
detail, under the ruling of the provisions relating to “simple co-operation”, 
“joint enterprise” and “co-operative joint enterprise.”
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Thus partnerships and joint enterprises established by socialist organisa­
tions show two characteristics:
1. Partnerships, joint enterprises of state character, if
a) they are founded by state enterprises (economic organisations), and 
also the partners are state enterprises without exception;
b) the founders arc different socialist organisations, but there is among 
them at least one state enterprise;
c) the founders are state enterprises, and other socialist organisations 
have entered the partnership, or joined the enterprise later.
2. Partnerships, joint enterprises of co-operative character, if
a) the founders are solely co-operatives, and all participants are also 
co-operatives (Although the sui generis legal forms ol co-operative partnerships 
and joint enterprises are laid down in the Agricultural Production Go-opera­
tives Act, according to the correct legal interpretation a partnership or joint 
enterprise of co-operative character is established in every case where also non- 
agricultural production co-operatives or other socialist organisations not qua­
lified as state enterprises are among the founders, but at least one of the 
foundation members is an agricultural production co-operative);
b) the founders are co-operatives, and state enterprises entered the part­
nership only later.
Irrespective of the character of partnership or enterprise, a mixed social, 
inter-sector form of ownership emerges in respect to the assets which go over 
into common ownership and in respect to the enterprises in every case where 
socialist organisations of different types enter into partnership or participate 
in a joint enterprise.
When rules are framed for management relating to the dynamical facet 
of property, the mixed nature of ownership must be taken into account. 
Evidently because of time pressure, Hungarian legislation has failed to do so 
till now. Namely valid Hungarian law, focussing attention merely on the 
founders, only offers two possibilities: partnerships and joint enterprises must 
be placed in legal circumstances defined either by rules relating to state enter­
prises, or by rules relating to co-operatives (more exactly, to agricultural pro­
duction co-operatives). Experience so far has shown that this solution is not 
satisfactory because
a) rules of management, developed within the sphere of state ownership 
are forced upon socialist organisations not belonging to the state sector, and 
this is the case rather often, whenever an economic organisation of the state 
is among the founders. One cannot simply create a partnership, a joint enter­
prise of “state character” irrespective of the circumstance what task such 
partnership or enterprise undertakes to perform, and under what conditions of 
management, in what economic environment these tasks can be best accomp­
lished. Under present regulation, whenever a co-operative wishes to enter into 
partnership as a founder with a state enterprise, it can only do so by joining 
a partnership or joint enterprise of state character:
b) the difference between the management of state enterprises and other 
socialist organisations is so essential that it cannot be resolved even by a sound 
compromise;
c) economic units of different sectors are hindered in the realisation of 
their intentions to enter into partnership with one another, because they are
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forced to put up with economic conditions that differ from those they had 
been accustomed to, regardless of whether this is good or not good for them, 
practically by mere chance. In practice it is mainly because of the unjustified 
inflexibility of credit regulations that state enterprises and agricultural pro­
duction co-operatives have difficulties in establishing, or do not establish at all, 
partnerships and joint enterprises, although this would be needed badly espe­
cially for developing a soundly co-ordinated food economy where profits and 
losses are shared more equitably than so far.
Valid Hungarian law contains no provisions in respect to partnerships 
and joint enterprises that socialist organisations wish to establish with partici­
pants other than economic organisations of the state, and agricultural pro­
duction co-operatives. (E.g. general consumers’ and sales co-operatives, 
industrial co-operatives, associations.)
In order to facilitate the uniform partnership possibilities for various 
socialist organisations:
a) the uniform law of association must be framed. Several variants of 
partnership must be included in the uniform law, under which the prospective 
partners — irrespective of what type of socialist organisation they represent — 
can choose freely that particular model of partnership which best fits their 
circumstances, potentialities, and the target to be attained by such part­
nership;
b) the system of economic regulators must be developed further, into 
one which co-ordinates the interests of the various sectors; and this is an urgent 
matter because the lack of satisfactory regulations already hinders considerably 
the establishment of economically desirable partnerships. Economic regulators 
relating to inter-sector partnerships and joint enterprises must not lay down 
only two possibilities of choice; an adequate system must be shaped with 
the combination of the present regulators, and this system must be flexible 
enough so that its practical application should promote the inter-sector part­
nership of economic units in those fields where this is necessary for the concent­
ration of production, a better satisfaction of needs.
The mixed, inter-sector type of social ownership will be able to develop 
soundly only if legislation takes into account consistently the novel features 
arising from the inter-sector, mixed character of ownership, and carries out 
logically the reorganisation demanded by these novel features also in regulating 
management in respect to the dynamical facet of ownership.
13. Little attention has been paid so far to the other forms of rjroup 
ownership. Basically, we only have taken into account state socialist and 
co-operative socialist ownership, and in the sphere of the former, literature 
lias been mostly concerned only with the problems of state ownership inherent 
in enterprisal assets. Owing to the recent development of the economic inde­
pendence of local councils, greater attention must be paid in the future to the 
conditions of organisations financed by the state budget. At the same time we 
must be fully aware of the fact that, besides the aforementioned novel con­
structions of ownership, joint ownership, which appears as social ownership 
at the same time, has older, less conspicuous forms, such as the proprietary 
relations of different associations, e.g. water conservancy or irrigation associ­
ations; or society ownership, none of which can be ranged with the sphere of 
either state or co-operative ownership, and, to all appearances, cannot be settled
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simply by providing that either the rules of state socialist ownership, or those 
of co-operative ownership must be applied logically to them.
The changes that have taken place in the sphere of state and co-operative 
socialist ownership raise some problems in respect to the relationship of these two. 
On the basis of recent development, we categorically reject the view according 
to which co-operative ownership, and group ownership in general, is not 
consistently socialistic. Co-operative socialist ownership precisely materialises 
all criteria which a form of ownership deserving the socialist attribute must 
have. It adequately expresses the degree of production socialisation. It has 
nothing to do with exploitation, the principal or sole incomes of the members 
are derived from work. A certain part of the assets of agricultural production 
co-operatives is added to the indivisible co-operative fund, and the circle of 
owners is widening through this, and through appropriation transmitted by 
the joint enterprises of the partnerships. Under the effect of the various income 
regulators of the state, they also contribute to central accumulation.
What has been said above serves also as an argument against the view 
according to which co-operative ownership is an inferior form of social owner­
ship. Doubtless, the property of production co-operatives expresses a lower 
concentration of the forces of production, but is reflects the given concentration 
accurately, and in this respect shows reality much better than does state 
ownership in some cases. Further, co-operative ownership — as is shown by 
most recent development — is no obstacle to the concentration of productive 
forces; on the contrary, it can resort to the means of concentration with ease, 
on the basis of voluntary decision, at the proper time, if this is deemed neces­
sary (simpler collaboration, co-operative joint undertaking, co-operative enter­
prise, joining the partnerships of state enterprises, etc.).
Ever since the commodity-monetary relations, the operation of the law 
of value, have won recognition in the socialist society, ever since it has been 
evident that a socialist economy is a commodity-producing economy, the 
discriminating argument that work done in co-operatives becomes social work 
only indirectly can be left out of account, for we do know that work becomes 
social only indirectly also in the sphere of state ownership, through a com­
parison of its products with other products. The question whether co-operative 
ownership constitutes a socialist form of ownership only under the rule of state 
ownership, will be discussed elsewhere.
Is the thesis that the state directs the national economy chiefly by relying 
on its own proprietorship a correct one ? I believe that the state, as the supreme 
executive power entrusted with the planned direction of the socialist economy, 
relies equally on both types of social ownership. In essence, these two contribute 
equally to central accumulation, and the state will never, can never, release 
the co-operatives from their obligation to contribute to central accumulation.
As concerns the methods of management, state enterprises and co-operatives 
keep getting nearer to one another.
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CHAPTER V.
SUMMARY
14. Brief summary of changes, conclusions.
15. What may come next?
14. Some conclusions can be drawn on the basis of the changes. These 
changes affect state socialist ownership, co-operative socialist ownership, and 
the relationship between the two. Signs of certain rearrangement appear 
within certain forms of ownership, and also between forms of ownership. The 
dividing line between the two traditional forms of socialist ownership becomes 
indistinct, some features of the socialist state’s economic controlling function 
are changing. On the basis of experience available in the Hungarian People’s 
Republic, the characteristic features of social ownership can be summed up as 
follows:
1 Taking as the basis valid legal regulation, the indivisibility and unity 
of the state’s socialist ownership continues unchanged for the time being. 
Yet the owner state employs self-restriction in order to ensure the self-move­
ment of economic automatisms appearing on the enterprise (trust, association, 
partnership) level so that they can express separate enterprisal interests, and 
make them clashing on the market. In the legal sense, self- restriction is 
manifest in the accurate definition through provisions of law of the scope of 
economic activities of state organs of various levels, and of the range of function 
of enterprises. Decisions of the state, if they relate to automatisms, are directed 
to the enterprises, and do not dispose of their means of production outside 
them, or without them.
2. Fundamental means of production remain in state ownership. Means of 
production are qualified as fundamental if they belong to production units 
which represent such a concentration level of productive forces for which the 
all-social character of property must be manifest in the form of state ownership 
because of the high-degree socialisation of production and appropriation. Thus, 
in the last analysis, it is not the important or less important nature of the 
means of production that is decisive — although this is not disregarded 
either: what is decisive here is the circumstance whether given means of 
production are employed in economic activities on a higher or lower degree 
of production socialisation.
3. But the state does not aim at becoming the owner of all fundamental 
means of production, or of the majority of means of production. Namely neither 
the state’s economic controlling activity, nor its political power depends on 
the bulk of the means of production being owned by the state or not. Part of 
the means of production — which in the former view only could have been 
owned by the state — have already been removed from the sphere of state 
ownership, and went over mainly into co-operative proprietorship. The hand­
ing over of important means of production, sometimes of entire plants, to 
other socialist organisations is going on. A process emerges during which co­
operatives or their partnerships take over further means of production from 
the state, and other means go over into mixed inter-sector social ownership 
as the property of state and co-operative partnerships. On this basis it is possible 
that production, socialised to the level of medium units, will be carried on in 
the future on the foundations of group ownership, within the scope of an
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ownership level that suits the degree of production socialisation. In my view, 
this largely settles the dispute over what sort of relationship there should exist 
between the state and its enterprises,because what is actually involved here is the 
question of what means of production should be owned by the state.
4. Tf we regard the order of importance, we sec that central public revenue, 
as the object of state ownership, gets prominence over the state ownership 
of means of production. In direct proportion to the development of the new 
economic system, this will become the most important object of the state’s 
socialist ownership. Public revenue is the financial basis of the decisively 
important credit policy of the state, serves as the source of forming funds for 
economic development, structural changes, which serve for accelerating 
efficiency, eliminating disequilibrium, and for supporting economic-political 
decisions in general. It is from here that enterprises and production branches of 
low efficiency, ensuring only incomes below the average, and their employees 
will be shifted to courses of econo mi cal ness and higher efficiency, in short, 
that macro-economic decisions will be backed up. Central public revenue serves 
as the source for supplying extra-economic fields (cultural, health, social 
services, education, etc.).
5. State property shows predominantly the characteristics of commodity 
property, thus the older thesis according to which state property is usually 
not commodity property does not hold. Commodities are things produced not for 
satisfying own needs, but for being exchanged for other goods on the market. 
The bulk of the objects of state ownership appear on the market and are 
exchanged for other products. The liberty of producing commodities and 
exchanging them for others is ensured to state automatisms.
6. The potentiality of the socialist state, as the supreme executive power, 
to direct the national economy arises from its political power. Both forms of 
social ownership are equally the supporters of this power. Hence also the 
thesis seems to be outdated that the state exercises political power and economic 
organisational activities on the basis of its proprietorship, as the owner of the 
basic means of production, or the owner of the majority of means of pro­
duction.
7. Co-operative socialist ownership is a form of socialist ownership of the 
same rank as stale ownership. But to realise this equality of rights on every 
level, much yet remains to be done. Possibilities must be created to raise 
production concentration to a higher level through the co-operatives. Pro­
hibitive rules, which exclude co-operatives from certain spheres of activity and 
create monopolies for the state sector, must be abolished gradually. Better 
possibilities must be created for attaching certain activities of the food economy 
to agricultural production co-operatives, by surrendering these activities in 
the field of production and interest to co-operatives, their partnerships, or to 
co-operative and state partnerships. The circumstance that the management 
of eo-operatives, which are owners of the means of production and perform 
productive activities with the work of their members, keeps getting nearer to 
the management methods of state enterprises results in further differentiation 
among co-operatives. The internal contents of ownership relations, the manner 
of activity, the organisation needed for this activity, conditions of internal 
life in production co-operatives, show trends that differ from those in other 
co-operatives. But apart from differentiation, economy — and even more so
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when the councils are transformed from local organisations os state power into 
self-governing bodies — another new form of social group ownership emerges 
in the form of municipal ownership.
11. It admits of no doubt that we are confronted with a novel form of 
social ownership in the case of suprastate or interstate ownership that realises 
a very high degree of the concentration of productive forces through inter­
national joint enterprises established in the course of international economic 
co-operation.
*
15. This is the situation at present in respect to social ownership, or, more 
exactly, this is the situation in Hungary. Yet the possibility tha t a still newer 
structure of social ownership will emerge in the future cannot be excluded. 
And such a structure might be like this:
A system of socialist ownership in which
a) the socialist state, on the basis of its political power,
b) relying on centralised income collected by it from the accumulation of 
social production,
c) defining as the owner economic automatisms free from exploitation,
d) as creditor number one, through various preferences,
e) determining the long-term plans of economic development, the general 
trend of developing the people's economy,
f )  working out the regulators of automatisms, and making the regulators 
compulsory for the automatisms by means of provisions of law' that take the 
form of the state’s will,
g) making available the management variants striving after optimal 
results,
h) promoting, and supporting free of charge, certain tasks by special 
intervention, is leading the people’s economy towards a single aim, towards 
socialism, communism.
N O TES
1 L en in : R epo rter’s speech on w ar and  peace a t  the  R ussian C om m unist (Bolshevik) 
P a r ty ’s V TIth Congress. Lenin’s W orks, Szikra, B udapest, 1952. vol. 27, pp. 70 — 77.
- Engels: A nti-D lihring, Szikra, B udapest, 1950. p. 277.
3 The socialist revolution differs from the bourgeois exactly  in th a t  in the la t te r  case the 
com plete form s o f cap ita list relations are  given, while Soviet power, p ro letarian  power, had to do 
w ithout such relations, unless we count in the m ost-developed form s of capitalism , which, essen­
tially, extended only to the small top stratum of the industries, and affected agriculture only to an in ­
significant measure (italics m ine, I.S.).
Lenin: R eporter’s speech on w ar and  peace a t the RC(B)P V ll th  Congress. L en in’s W orks, 
Szikra, B udapest, 1952. vol. 27, pp. 70 — 77.
4 C ontrary  to  the general view, according to  w hich the establishm ent of large agricu ltu ral 
production  un its would have been economical im m ediately a fte r the revolution — afte r having 
changed over to  building socialism — in the countries in question, I  profess th a t  in the given 
s itua tion  there  was no b e tte r  solution from th e  economic and m anagem ent po in t of view than  
to  d is tribu te  land for individual farm ing — to transfer i t  in to  p rivate  ow nership in the  people’s 
dem ocratic sta tes. In  given circum stances (the peasan try ’s claim to  th e  ow nership of land, ru ined 
agricu ltu ral production, which had been of very low standards anyw ay; the absence o f co-opera­
tive thinking) large agricultural u n its  would have had substan tia lly  g rea ter difficulties in s ta r t ­
ing production and  raising i t  to  fairly high standards w ithin a relatively  sho rt tim e. O therwise
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the  economic po in t of view in such oases of social im portance only represents one facet of the 
problem s, and m ust n o t be in terp re ted  in a  “sterile” m anner, b u t only as affected by all o ther 
circum stances, by  politics firs t of all.
5 .Marx and  Engels have n o t m ade a  thorough analysis of the s ta te ’s role in a  socialist 
(com m unist) econom y. In  his A nti-D ühring (H errn Eugen Dührings U m w älzung der W issen­
schaft), w ritten  also in the defence o f M arx’s theses, in the 1894 S tu ttg a r t edition (“ th ird , revis­
ed, enlarged” edition) published shortly  before his death , Engels w rites ab o u t the economic role 
o f the proletarian  s ta te  as follows: “The p ro le ta ria t seizes s ta te  pow er, and  for the tim e being 
transform s th e  m eans of production in to  s ta te  property . Y et by doing so i t  abolishes itself as 
the p ro le taria t, abolishes all class differences and  class contradictions, and  thereby  abolishes the 
sta te  as a  s ta te .” A few sentences farther: “By becom ing a t  last ac tua lly  (i.e. th e  s ta te , I.S.) the 
represen tative of the en tire  society, i t  renders itself unnecessary. As soon as there will no longer 
be any  social class to  be oppressed, as soon as class rule and  struggle for individual life rooted 
in  the anarchy  of production till then , as well as the clashes and  violence resulting  from  this, 
will cease to  exist, there will be nothing left to  be oppressed, nothing th a t  would require a  special 
power o f oppression, a  s ta te . The firs t a c t by which the s ta te  ac tua lly  appears as th e  representa­
tive of en tire  society — by  tak ing  possession o f the m eans of production in the nam e of society — 
will be a t  the sam e tim e its last independent a c t as a  s ta te .”
6 The in ternal, political, oppressive, the ex ternal defensive, and  the economic organising 
and cu ltu ra l educational functions are usually  referred to as the functions of the socialist sta te . 
This definition of the principal courses o f uniform  s ta te  function  m ay be term ed as correct 
beyond doubt. B u t it  is by  no means acceptable to  separate  these functions from  one ano ther in 
an  inflexible m anner, and , consequently, to  restric t the in ternal oppressive function  — and  the 
activ ities o f the  in s trum en t of coercion — exclusively to the  political field. E m ploym ent of the 
in strum en t o f coercion m ight become necessary also in th e  economic organising function. Thus 
the existence o f the in strum en t o f coercion is im p o rtan t also from the economic point o f view. 
T h a t the activities of the s ta te ’s organ of coercion are of a  larger volum e in the beginning, and  it  
becomes sm aller and  sm aller as the building of socialism proceeds, is ano ther m atte r . In  March 
1918 Lenin w rote on the tasks facing the Soviet sta te  as follows: “The organisation of registration, 
supervision over th e  largest p lants, transform ation  of the entire m achinery of s ta te  economy into 
a  single, im mense m achine, into an  economic organisation which works in such a way th a t hund ­
reds o f millions of people should be led by a single plan, th is is the gigantic organisational task  
th a t we have to  shoulder. . .  We have come up  against trem endous difficulties in th is field. To all 
who w anted to consider the tasks of the revolution  seriously i t  was im m ediately ev ident th a t  to 
overcome the disintegration which the war had b rought ab o u t in the cap ita list society will only 
be possible on th e  hard  and  long way of self-discipline; we shall be able to  overcome th is disintegra­
tion, to  fig h t down the elem ents who m ake disintegration worse, who saw  a m eans in the revo­
lution for getting  rid  of old lim itations, and  try  to  squeeze o u t the m axim um  of it, only by ex- 
trem ly difficult, long and  persisten t work. In  our p e tty  bourgeois country , in th e  circum stances 
o f incredible economic decay, it  was inevitable th a t  g rea t num bers of such  elem ents raise their 
heads, and  the figh t against these elem ents will be a hundred tim es more difficult — i t  does no t 
promise any  p rom pt success.”
Lenin: R eporter’s speech on w ar and  peace a t  the RC(B)P V H the Congress. L enin’s W orks, 
Szikra, B udapest, 1952. vol. 27, p. 77.
7 In  A nti-D ühring Engels describes the process during which the social character o f the 
productive forces developed, and  their social productive character won actual recognition. Engels 
also points o u t th a t nationalisation  does no t m ean in every case th a t i t  is an actua l recognition 
of the social character of th e  social forces of production; b u t th a t  nationalisation  takes place 
or o ther reasons.
“I t  is th is counterpressure directed by the trem endously growing productive forces against 
their capita l-quality , this increasing compulsion to  recognise their social na tu re , th a t  force the 
capitalist class to  tre a t them  increasingly as social productive forces, so fa r as th is is possible a t  
a ll under cap ita list conditions. The period o f industrial prosperity  w ith its boundless inflation of 
credits, ns well as the sm ash w ith the collapse of big cap ita list com panies, have pushed masses 
o f m eans of production  tow ards th a t  form of socialisation which appears in the various sorts of 
jo in t stock companies. Some of these m eans o f production and  com m unication are so immense 
from the ou tset, as railw ays for instance, th a t  they  preclude any  o ther form of cap ita list u tilisa­
tion. A t a  certain  stage of developm ent, even th is form proves to be inadequate: the big inland 
producers o f th e  sam e industria l b ranch  congregate in “ tru s ts” , in associations aim ed a t  the re­
gulation of production; they  determ ine the to ta l q u an tity  to  be produced, d is tribu te  it  am ong 
them selves, and enforce in this way the purchase price fixed beforehand. Since, however, such
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tru s ts  usually  d is in tegrate a t  th e  f irs t depression, th ey  give rise to  a  still more concentrated  
socialisation ju s t because this; the  entire industria l b ranch  is transform ing in to  a  single, big jo in t 
stock  com pany, inland com petition is replaced by  the inland m onopoly of one single com pany; 
ju s t  us this happened as early  as 1890 to English alkali production, which — afte r the m erger 
o f all the  forty-eight big factories — is now in th e  hands of a single, uniform ly m anaged com pany 
w ith a  cap ita l o f 120 million m ark.
In  tru s ts  free com petition swings into monopolies, th e  planless production of the cap ita list 
society surrenders to the p lanned production of the  coming socialist society. T rue, to  the benefit 
and  advan tage  o f capitalists for the tim e being. Y et exp lo ita tion  becomes so a p p a ra n t here 
th a t  it  m ust collapse. N o t one people would to lerate  a  control o f production by tru s ts , such an 
o u trig h t exploitation  o f the com m unity by  a handfu l gang of coupon-cutters.
One way o r ano ther, w ith or w ithout tru sts , it  is nevertheless the  s ta te , the official repre­
sen ta tive  o f the  cap ita list society, th a t  m ust take  contro l of production finally. T his necessity 
of transform ation  in to  s ta te  p ro p erty  f irs t appears a t th e  big in stitu tions o f com m unication: the 
post, th e  telegraphic system , the railw ays.”
Engels: A nti-D ühring, Szikra, B udapest, 1950. pp. 285 — 287.
In  a  no te  a ttached  to  these lines Engels explains th a t  cap ita list nationalisation  represents 
progress only if nationalisation  “has become economically unavoidable” :
“ F or only in case if the m eans of production o r com m unication have actually outgrow n 
Írom  th e  contro l o f jo in t stock com panies, if therefore nationalisation  has become economically 
unavoidable, only in th is case is i t  economic progress — even if carried o u t by the s ta te  as i t  is 
today  — only in this case is i t  a  new step  tow ard tak ing  possession of all forces o f production by  
society itself. Y et recently , since Bism arck has throw n him self in to  nationalisation , a certa in  
kind of perverted  socialism has em erged, which even has degenerated into so rt o f lackeying 
occasionally, and  declares w ithou t fu r th e r ado th a t  any nationalisation, even the B ism arckian, 
is socialistic. Of course, if  the nationalisation  of tobacco would m ean socialism, then also N apo­
leon, also M etternich ought to  be counted am ong th e  founders of socialism. W hen the Belgian 
s ta te , for quite o rd inary  political and financial considerations, constructed  th e  principal rail­
ways itself, when Bism arck, w ithout any economic necessity, nationalised P russia’s principal 
railw ay lines sim ply for equipping and utilising them  b e tte r  in case of war, for bringing up  the 
railw ay officials to  be th e  voting horde of the governm ent, and , chiefly, for securing for him self a 
new source of income independent of parliam en tary  decisions — all these steps were by  no m eans 
socialistic, neither d irectly  nor indirectly, neither deliberately  no r unknow ingly. W hy, if they  
were, then even the Prussian R oyal S tate B ank (Seehandlung), the R oyal Porcelain M anufacture, 
or the m ilitary  ta ilo r would be socialist in stitu tions (and even, th e  nationalisation  of the brothels, 
as was suggested quite seriously by  a  sly fox under F rederick  W illiam I I I  in the th irties.)”
(Engels’s note) Engels: A nti-D ühring, Szikra, B udapest, 1950, pp. 2 8 6 -2 8 7 .
A lthough Engels speaks o f cap ita list nationalisation  in the quoted passages, his rem arks 
are directive in two respects also for appropriation , or, in m ore detail, for the socialist system  o f 
p roperty  socialisation.
a) A lready  a t  the beginning of socialist building, those m eans of production m ust be n a ­
tionalised which are used in a field where the social character o f th e  productive forces has been 
realised a t  th e  tim e of th e  socialist revolution.
b) I t  is no t absolutely  necessary to  nationalise those m eans o f production which do n o t 
m eet th is condition. These are preferably left in p riva te  ow nership (see notes 8 and  9), o r ow ner­
ship should be placed a t  a  lower level o f socialisation.
I t  nevertheless m ay be considered to draw  in to  the sphere of s ta te  ow nership such activities 
in whose sphere the social character o f the productive forces had n o t y e t developed to  a  high 
level by the  beginnings o f socialist building; b u t for statisfy ing dom estic dem ands, o r on account 
o f the ir com petition w ith  cap ita list surroundings, these activ ities m ust be developed rap id ly  (it 
m ay  happen th a t in some advanced cap ita list countries the productive forces in the sphere of 
such activities are of a  social character — recognised as such or n o t — and th a t a lag appears 
only in the country  o f th e  victorious revolution). W hat I  m ean by  this is the nationalisation of the 
ac tiv ity ; the creation of productive forces of social character w ithin the sphere of th is ac tiv ity  
comes a fte r this.
8 The comprehensive nationalisation  of house-property in H ungary  has imposed an immense 
burden on the people’s economy (the sta te), and the equivalent could no t be collected from the 
low rents. As a  consequence, the form er owners were given the possibility to  claim their houses 
again a fte r  some tim e, o r th e  houses — fam ily houses firs t o f all — were sold by  the s ta te  to  p ri­
vate  persons on favourable term s. Of the living-houses only th e  big lodging houses are  ow ned by  
the  s ta te  in H ungary  a t  present.
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In  order to  increase the num ber of fla ts , the  s ta te  em ploys vigorous incentives to encourage 
the building of p rivate  f la ts  (family houses, blocks o f freehold fla ts), g ran ting  long-term  credits 
to  builders, and supporting  the form ation of housing co-operatives. The capacity  of sta te  bu ild ­
ing trad e  is being expanded, and  there  is am ple opporunity  for expanding the co-operative build­
ing trade.
'■> W henever things were ram m ed th rough  existing p rac tica l conditions this produced 
disadvantageous consequences. This happened when village barbers, cobblers, tinsm iths, coopers 
satisfying the needs of a village;, wheelwrights, shoeing-sm iths, bakers were nationalised or orga­
nised in to  co-operatives; the ir productive ac tiv ities were “centralised” in m any cases, village 
workshops were closed dow n, and  “socialist m anufactures” were organised for them  in d is tric t 
centres, o r in larger villages. The provision o f services was m ade cum bersom e in this way — for 
who would travel 10 — 15 kilom etres to  have a shave, who would take  his leaky  po ts as far, even 
a  founder would hard ly  am ble farther. The num ber of adm in istra tive  s ta ff grew to the detrim ent 
o f tin; producers. R ealising all this, the  governm ent m ade it possible for socialised craftsm en to 
reopen their workshops in villages and  to  work as private  artisans. W here nationalisation  or orga­
nisation into co-operatives stood the te s t (in towns, places of easy access), the s ta te  hairdresser’s 
shops, e tc. or co-operatives continued.
10 F or more details of tin; idea see the studies published in “ Questions A etuelles du Socia- 
lisme” (Revue Trim estrielle Yougoslave), I960, vol. 83 (O ctober —December).
11 Also in th is volum e tw o studies are devoted to  this question for the m ost part. A num ber 
of o th er papers have been published on th is subject. To give an  idea of them , we m ention a few.
The changes th a t  took place in the system  of socialist ow nership cap tu red  the a tten tion  of 
jurisprudence, too. A vigorous polemic arose firs t of all ab o u t the  in terrelationship  of the sta te  
and the autom atism s working within the sphere of s ta te  ownership.
All partic ipan ts o f the debate  tried  to  grasp also theoretically  th e  substance of those changes 
which m ake a ltera tions justified  also in the field of ju ristic  a ttitu d e .
a)  S ta te  enterprises in the capacity  of owners of com m odities (m. V ilághy: The S tate  and 
its E nterprises, Jog tudom ányi Közlöny, 1907, vol. 10— 11).
b) E n terprisa l ow nership (for a rich docum entation  of th e  lite ra tu re  see Tam ás Sdrközy: 
Questions o f Principles in E nterprise  M anagem ent, Jog tudom ány i K özlöny, 1969, vol. 2 — 3).
c) The politico-legal character o f s ta te  ownership (Tam ás Sárközy, op. eit. Jog tudom ányi 
Közlöny, 19G9, vol. 2 — 3).
d) The divided form  of ow nership (severalty) (Im re Sárándi: Some Legal Problem s of the 
New Economic M echanism, Jog tudom ányi Közlöny, 1908. vol. 2).
The views held on these sub jec ts have approached reality  from  different angles. A t the 
same tim e — although the d ispu tan ts disprove m utually  th e ir views in the hea t of the debate  — 
we m ay say th a t  all views have taken  us one step  forward in the direction of form ulating the new 
conception o f social ownership.
We g e t even assistance in th is respect from the view which in terp re ts the present changes 
as partial changes w ithin continu ity  which do not affect the basic conception. B u t even here the 
idea has been raised th a t  a lthough a t  p resent we have these changes only, the possibility of fu rther 
changes affecting the basic construction  as well cannot be excluded. (Gyula Eörsi: Legal Aspects 
of the  Shifting to  the New System of Economic Control. K özgazdasági és Jogi K önyvkiadó, 
B udapest, 1908, pp. 167 — 169).
12 B u t the views presented  did no t rem ain purely  theoretical theses. They becam e norm ative 
rules in a num ber of provisions of law. A fter explaining the substance of the juristic  view, we 
present in these eases the provisions of law in which th e  particu lar views appears in the form of a 
norm ative provisions.
13 Cf. Miidós V ilághy — G yula Eörsi: H ungarian Civil Law  (U niversity tex tbook , Tankönyv- 
kiadó, B udapest, 1905. vol. I).
11 G overnm ent Decree 11/1967 (V. 13) K orm ., Section 38. Jogszabálygyűjtem ény I , pp- 
1 2 7 -1 3 7 , 318. (P. K . 24), 1967, PM publication.
15 In  connection w ith the solution see th e  critical rem arks of G yula Eörsi (Gyula Eörsi: 
Legal Aspects of th e  Shifting to  the New System  of Economic Control. Közgazdasági és Jogi 
K önyvkiadó, B udapest, 1968, pp. 208 — 219).
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
1. K ap ite l 1 befasst sich m it der klassischen O rdnung und  T heorie des gesellschaftlichen 
E igentum s. Der Verfasser u n te rsuch t die Verhältnisse, u n te r denen sieh das gesellschaftliche E igen­
tum  entw ickelt ha t. E r  w idm et der w irtschaftlich-gesellschaftlichen M otiv iertheit der V erstaa t­
lichungen eine besondere A ufm erksam keit, wobei er festste llt, dass in gewissen Fällen -  als au f 
dem  gegebenen G ebiet die Sozialisierung der P roduktion  noch sehr niedrig w ar — die Problem e 
auch  durch  V erstaatlichung n ich t gelöst werden konnten , und  die übereilten V erstaatlichungen 
die Schw ierigkeiten sogar steigerten. Die w irtschaftlichen A utom atism en spielten früher eine 
geringe Rolle. Zum Abschluss wird jene grundsätzliche Frage aufgew orfen, ob das S taatseigen­
tum  der P roduktionsm itte l unbedingt notw endig is t, d am it die gesellschaftliche P roduk tion  im 
Interesse des Volkes geschieht.
2. K ap ite l 2 behandelt die jugoslawische K onzeption des gesellschaftlichen E igentum s. 
Dieses K apite l e n th ä lt das Wesen der jugoslaw ischen Theorie über das E igentum srech t und  zeigt 
dann  das V erhältnis zwischen den S taats- und W irtschaftsorganen in  Jugoslaw ien.
3. N ach E rö rterung  der klassischen eigentum sreehtliehen Regelung und E igentum sauffas­
sung, sowie der jugoslawischen Theorien wird erw ähnt, was fü r Ä nderungen im klassischen Mo­
d e la d a s  im K apitel 1 dargestellt wurde, eingetreten sind. E s änderte  sich das V erhältnis zwischen 
dem  S ta a t und seinen U nternehm en. Die Selbständigkeit der U nternehm en w urde b re it aus- 
gebaut. Der K reis der O bjekte des genossenschaftlichen sozialistischen E igentum s w urde und 
wird ständig  w eiter ausgedehnt. Das genossenschaftliche E igentum  is t -  falls seine G leichbe­
rechtigung m it dem S taatseigentum  gesichert wird -  dazu geeignet, dass es als ein m aterielles 
V erhältnis und eine R echtsform  im  A ufbau des Sozialismus eine wichtige Rolle spielt.
4. E s erscheinen neue Träger des gesellschaftlichen E igentum s. E s e n ts teh t das gem ischte 
gesellschaftliche (Zw ischensektoren)-Eigentum . Die Regeln der dynam ischen Seite des E igentum s, 
der W irtschaftung, müssen aber — zum indest nach  den ungarischen E rfahrungen — w eiteren t­
w ickelt werden, weil die Regler der W irtschaftsorganisationen, die weder aufgrund des S taats- 
eigentum s, noch aufgrund des genossenschaftlichen E igentum s arbeiten , den A nforderungen der 
U nternehm en entsprechen, die aufgrund des Zw ischensektoreneigentum s arbeiten . A usser dem 
genannten Zwischensektoreneigentum  können noch andere neue Form en des gesellschaftlichen 
G ruppeneigentum s beobachtet werden. Einige von diesen neuen Form en bestanden  schon früher, 
andere sind neu entstanden .
5. Im  K ap ite l 5 w ird die ganze A bhandlung zusam m engefasst.
a) Das S taatseigentum  und  das genossenschaftliche (G ruppen-)Eigentum  bilden auch  nach 
den eingelretenen Ä nderungen das R ückgra t des gesellschaftlichen E igentum s. Das S taatseigen­
tum  is t un te ilbar und einheitlich, aber der S taa t ü b t Selbsteinschränkung aus, um  seinen U n te r­
nehm en im W irtschaftsleben vor allem au f dem G ebiet der K red ite , des P roduk tenm ark tes und 
der inneren O rganisation die Bewegungsfreiheit zu sichern.
b) E s bleiben im Staatseigentum  jene P roduktionsm itte l, die in den hochsozialisierten P ro ­
duktionseinheiten verw endet werden.
c) D er S ta a t is t aber n ich t bestreb t, E igentüm er säm tlicher grundlegender bzw. der M ehr­
zahl der P roduktionsm itte l zu werden.
d) H insichtlich seiner W ichtigkeit t r i t t  die zen trale  staatliche G eldeinnahm e, als O bjek t 
des sozialistischen S taatseigentum s in den V ordergrund.
e) Das S taatseigentum  h a t  überw iegend einen W arencharakter.
f )  Die Möglichkeit des sozialistischen S taates, als öffentlicher Gewalt, die W irtschaft zu 
lenken, w urzelt in seiner politischen M acht. Beide Form en des gesellschaftlichen E igentum s u n ­
te rstü tzen  diese M acht in gleichem Masse.
g) Das genossenschaftliche sozialistische E igentum  is t eine dem  S taatseigen tum  gleich­
wertige sozialistische E igentum sform .
h) Seitdem die M öglichkeit besteht, dass G enossenschaften und S taa tsun ternehm ungen  
un tereinander und m it anderen sozialistischen O rganisationen versclüedene Vereinigungen b il­
den, die im allgemeinen der Förderung der P roduktionskonzentration  dienen, zeigt sich in der 
alten S tru k tu r der gesellschaftlichen E igentum seinrichtung eine gewisse Auflösung. A uf diesem 
Gebiet is t die E ntstehung  und die wichtige Rohe des gem ischten (Zw isehensektoren)-Eigentum s 
von grösster B edeutung.
i)  Das gesellschaftliche E igentum  besitz t neben dem  staatlichen  und  genossenschaftlichen 
E igentum  solche Form en, vor allem im K reis des G ruppeneigentum s, au f welche die Regeln des 
genossenschaftlichen sozialistischen Eigentum srechtes n ich t einfach anw endbar sind.
3  ANNALES — Sectio Iu rid ica  — Toinus X II .
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j )  Die R echtsw issenschaft sollte sich m it den E igentum sproblem en der gemeinsam en U n­
ternehm en beschäftigen, die im  Laufe der w irtschaftlichen Z usam m enarbeit der sozialistischen 
N ationen (S taaten) en ts tanden  sind.
Je) Die Ä nderungen, die in  der U ngarischen V olksrepublik als E rgebnis der neuen W irt­
schaftsreform  im  gesellschaftlichen E igentum  eingetreten  sind, können einerseits n ich t als Ä n­
derungen b e trach te t werden, die fü r jedes andere sozialistische Land eine Lösung bilden, anderer­
seits können diesen Ä nderungen w eiter folgen, in jenem  Entw icklungsprozess, wo das gesell­
schaftliche E igen tum  im m er m ehr vervollkom m net wird.
РЕ ЗЮ М Е
1. Первая глава занимается классическим строем и теорией общественной собствен­
ности. Автор рассматривает обстоятельства образования общественной собственности. 
Обращает особое внимание на хозяйственную общественную обоснованность обобще­
ствления, устанавливая, что в некоторых случаях - когда в данной области обобществлен- 
ность производства была весьма низкой -  нельзя было решить проблемы даже обобще­
ствлением, поспешное решение увеличило трудности.
Хозяйственные автоматизмы раньше не играли большой роли. Наконец автор под­
нимает принципиальный вопрос, необходима ли государственная собственность на сред­
ства производства, чтобы общественное производство проходило в интересах народа.
2. Вторая глава знакомит с югославянской концепцией общественной собственности. 
В этой главе содержится сущность югославянского права собственности, затем указы­
вает на то, какая связь имеется между государственными и хозяйственными органами 
в Югославии.
3. После изложения классического строя права собственности и понятия собствен­
ности, а также югославянских теорий следует изложение тех изменений, которые произо­
шли в классических моделях, изображенных в первой главе. Изменилось отношение меж­
ду государством и его учреждениями. Самостоятельность учреждений начала рассширять- 
ся. Круг объектов кооперативного социалистического нрава собственности расширился 
и все расширяется. Кооперативная собственность — поскольку обеспечено ёе равно­
правие с государственной собственностью — как материальное отношение и правовая 
форма может играть важную роль в построении социализма.
4. Появляются новые носители общественной собственности. Образуется смешан­
ная (межсекторная) общественная собственность. Однако правила динамичной стороны 
права собственности, правила хозяйствования -  во всяком случае по венгерскому опыту 
-  нужно дальше развивать, ибо относительно организаций, действующих как на основе 
кооперативной собственности, так и на основе государственной собственности, регуля­
торы не удовлетворяют требования предприятий, действующих на основе межсекторной 
собственности. Кроме уже вышеупомянутой межсекторной собственности имеются новые 
формы общественно-групповой собственности. Одни из этих форм существовали и раньше, 
другие теперь образуются.
5. Пятая глава суммирует всю научную статью.
а) Государственная собственность и кооперативная собственность составляют суть 
общественной собственности, и после изменений. Государственная собственность недели­
ма и едина, но государство пользуется самоограничением, чтобы обеспечить для предприя­
тий свободу передвижения в экономической жизни, главным образом относительно кре­
дитов и на рынке произведенных благ, также как и во внутренней организации.
б) В государственной собственности остаются средства производства, использован­
ные в обобщественных на высокой ступени единицах производства.
в) Однако государство не стремится к тому, чтобы быть собственником всех основ­
ных средств производства, т. е. большей части средств производства.
г) По значению выступает на передний план центральный государственный денеж­
ный доход, как предмет государственного социалистического права собственности.
д) Государственная собственность представляет собой большую часть собственности 
товарного характера.
е) Возможность социалистического государства как государственной власти управ­
лять хозяйством, дана его политической властью, обе формы общественной собственности 
одинаково поддерживают эту власть.
ж) Кооперативная социалистическая собственность равноправна государственной 
собственности и социалистической форме собственности.
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з) С тех пор как открылась возможность для кооперативов и государственных учреж­
дений создать как между собой, так и с другими социалистическими организациями раз­
личные, способствующие обыкновенно концентрации производства объединения, старая 
структура собственнического общественного устройства разлагается. В этой сфере самыми 
значительными являются формирование смешанной (межсекторной) собственности и ее 
важное значение.
и) Общественная собственность имеет кро.ме государственной и кооперативной соб­
ственности такие формы, главно.м образом в сфере групповой собственности, к которым 
нельзя просто применять правила кооперативного социалистического права собствен­
ности.
й)  Юридическая наука должна заниматься проблемами права собственности общих 
предприятий, созданных в ходе экономического содружества социалистических народов 
(государств).
к)  В Венгерской Народной Республике перемены в общественной собственности, 
возникшие вследствие нового экономического механизма, с одной стороны не могут 
рассматриваться как изменения, обозначающие решение для других социалистических 
государств, с другой стороны эти изменения могут с.меняться дальнейшими изменениями 
в ходе того развития, при котором общественная собственность все более усовершенству­
ются.
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